Introduction
In 1985, Shamir [12] presented the notion of identity-based encryption (IBE) in which the user's identity represents his public key and consequently, no public key certificate is required. Shamir successfully managed to design an identitybased signature based on the RSA algorithm but he was unable to design an IBE because sharing an RSA modulus between different users makes RSA insecure [12] . The design of a provable secure IBE remained an open problem for sixteen years until Boneh and Franklin [4] proposed a provably secure IBE in the random oracle model based on bilinear maps. Subsequently, there has been a rapid development in IBE based on bilinear maps, such as [10, 13, 2, 3] .
However, all the previously mentioned IBEs are based on pairing operations. According to MIRACL benchmarks, a 512-bit Tate pairing takes 20 ms while a 1024-bit prime modular exponentiation takes 8.80 ms. The pairing computations are expensive compared to normal operations. The costly pairing computation limits it from being used in wide application, specially when time and power consumptions are a major concern such as in limited wireless sensor networks. Hence, the seek for a scheme that does not rely on pairings is desirable.
Another approach to design IBEs is based on the quadratic residuosity (QR) assumption. The first IBE based on this approach is due to Cocks [6] . This system is IND-ID-CPA secure in the random oracle model. It is time-efficient compared to pairing-based IBEs, but it produces a long ciphertext of two elements in Z N for every bit in the message.
The design of efficient IBEs without pairings was an open problem until Boneh, Gentry and Hamburg [5] presented two space-efficient systems (BasicIBE and AnonIBE) in which the ciphertext is reduced from 2l elements to only one element in Z N . As in Cocks' IBE, the security of BasicIBE is based on the QR assumption in the random oracle model. Although the concrete instantiation of BasicIBE is highly space-efficient, this comes at the cost of less time-efficient encryption/decryption algorithms. To encrypt an l-bit message, BasicIBE solves l + 1 equations in the form Rx 2 + Sy 2 ≡ 1 (mod N ) for known values of R, S and N [5] . Solving such an equation requires a 'solubility certificate' and obtaining these certificates requires the generation of primes [6, 8, 7] . The obtained certificates can be used to solve Rx 2 + Sy 2 ≡ 1 (mod N ) efficiently using the Cremona-Rusin algorithm [8] . The prime generation is a time-consuming process and it is the bottleneck in the BGH systems. Moreover, the decryption key is l elements in Z N because the identity ID is hashed to a different value to encrypt each bit. AnonIBE is based on BasicIBE and it is Anon-IND-ID-CPA secure in the standard model under the interactive quadratic residuosity (IQR) assumption [5] . Moreover, the ciphertext length is reduced to one element in Z N plus l + 1 bits.
Jhanwar and Barua [11] made some significant observations on the BGH systems (for solving equations in the form Rx 2 +Sy 2 ≡ 1 (mod N )) and proposed a trade-off system that reduces the private key length but increases the ciphertext length. They found that by knowing the value of S (mod N ), one can find a random solution to the equation Rx 2 + Sy 2 ≡ 1 (mod N ) using only one inversion in Z N . The sender solves only 2 √ l equations in the form Rx 2 +Sy 2 ≡ 1 (mod N ) using only 2 √ l inversions in Z N and thus, no prime generation is required. This increases the encryption/decryption speed dramatically. The private key is only one element in Z N . However, this system produces a large ciphertext of 2 √ l elements in Z N . Our Contribution. In this paper, we first some definitions and review Basic IBE. After that, we optimise BasicIBE in two steps. First, we prove that hashing the identity ID to a different value to encrypt each bit is as secure as hashing the identity once to encrypt the whole message and therefore, the private key length is reduced to one element in Z N . Then, we present a variant of BasicIBE (V-BasicIBE) which is both time-and space-efficient. Moreover, we prove that V-BasicIBE is as secure as BasicIBE. Although the proposed variant has the same ciphertext length as BasicIBE, it only solve two equations in the form Rx 2 + Sy 2 ≡ 1 (mod N ) regardless of the message length. We also present another version of V-BasicIBE with a time-space trade-off. For V-BasicIBE, with only the cost of one more element in Z N , the sender can find a solution to Rx 2 +Sy 2 ≡ 1 (mod N ) using only one inversion in Z N and the receiver does not have to solve any of these equations. The proposed variant is time-and powerefficient compared to other IBE systems. It does not use expensive-computational operations such as pairing like Boneh-Boyen or Boneh-Franklin IBEs [4, 2] or even a prime modular exponentiation such as RSA. Table 1 compares all systems in this paper, where V2-BasicIBE is the proposed systems with the trade-off applied. In this table, the symbol m represents prime modular exponentiation while e and p represents pairing operation and prime generation respectively. l represents the message length. The symbols G and G T represents an element in two groups G and G T such that e : G × G → G T . 
Definitions

IND-ID-CPA
The IND-ID-CPA security model of an IBE is described as a game between an adversary A and a challenger C [12, 4] . This game is as follows:
-Setup(λ): C generates the public parameters (P P ) and sends them to A and keeps the master secret (M SK) to himself. -Query Phase: In this phase, A sends private key queries to C for identities ID s of his choice. These queries are adaptive based on previous queries. -Challenge: Satisfied with private key queries, A sends to C two messages m 1 and m 2 for an identity ID * . C tosses a coin b ∈ [0, 1] randomly and encrypts m b using ID * . Note that ID * must not be queried in the query phase.
The advantage of A to attack a system ξ and win this game is:
If A submits two pairs of (ID 0 , m 0 ) and (ID 1 , m 1 ) in the challenge phase, then this game is called the ANON-IND-ID-CPA security model. The advantage of the adversary winning this game is the same as above.
QR assumption and Jacobi symbols
For a positive integer N , define the following set:
where a N is the Jacobi symbol of a w.r.t N [5] . The Quadratic Residue set QR(N ) is defined as follows
Definition 1 Quadratic Residuosity Assumption: Let RSAgen(λ) be a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm. This algorithm generates two equal size primes p, q. The QR assumption holds for RSAgen if it cannot distinguish between the following two distributions for all PPT algorithms A [5] .
In other words, the advantage of A against QR assumption
3 Review of the BasicIBE system [5] BasicIBE encrypts an l-bit message m using a square S ≡ s 2 (mod N ) where s ∈ R Z N , the user's identity ID and a pair of Jacobi symbols for each bit. It first hashes ID to different values H(ID, i) = u a R i = r 
Optimization of BasicIBE
Optimization of the private key length
As shown above, the BasicIBE system hashes the identity ID to different values
i , a ∈ {0, 1}. This has a negative impact on the system. First, the private key length is larger than the message by a factor of Z N which consumes bandwidth and memory. Second, the Private Key Generator (PKG) must generate n private keys of l elements in Z N where n is the number of users in the whole system. This overloads the PKG. Third, this not suitable for encrypting variable messages length.
In this section, we prove that hashing the identity ID to different values
Theorem 1
Hashing the identity ID to a different value to encrypt each bit is as secure as hashing the identity once to encrypt the whole message.
Proof. Jhanwar and Barua [1] showed that there is N − 1 solutions for the equation
The solution (x, y) for that equation is in the form:
where R i = t 2 and
Since t is random in Z * N , R i looks mathematically random exactly as R i = H(ID, i).
V-BasicIBE
In this section, we explain how to implement a variant of BasicIBE (V-BasicIBE) that is both time and space efficient. Like any other IBE, V-BasicIBE consists of four algorithms; Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt and Decrypt. 
for an odd number j = 2i + 1. To solve these equations, we review a product formula presented by Boneh, Gentry and Hamburg [5] . Proof. Same as Lemma 1.
To solve these equations, BasicIBE calculates [x 0 , y 0 ] and then uses Lemma 2 to find [x i , y i ] as follows. 
The ciphertext is C ← (S, c, c).
-Decrypt(C, r): The message can be retrieved from the ciphertext as follows.
Correctness: As in [5] , it is easy to prove that:
V-BasicIBE Security
Theorem 2 Suppose the quadratic residuosity assumption holds for RSAgen and F is a secure PRF. Then the proposed V-BasicIBE is IND-ID-CPA secure based on the QR assumption when H is modelled as a random oracle. In particular, suppose A is an efficient IND-ID-CPA adversary, then there exist efficient algorithms B 1 , B 2 whose running time is the same as that of A such that:
We first introduce Lemma 3 [5] .
Lemma 3. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus, S i , R ∈ J(N ). Then Proof. Let s i , s i be the four square roots of S i ∈ QR(N ) such that s i = s i (mod p) and s i = −s i (mod q), then the four square roots of S i are {±s i , ±s i }. We can assume the same for R ∈ QR(N ) and the four square roots are {±r, ±r}, where r = r (mod p) and r = −r (mod q).
That means that among the four Jacobi symbols
two are +1 and two are −1. Case 2 and Case 3 can be proven similarly to Case 1.
-Security Proof. We define a sequence of games and let W i represents the winning of the i th game by the adversary A. These games are defined as follows.
• Game-0. This game is the usual adversarial game.
• Game-1. This game replaces the PRF F with a truly random function.
• Game-2. This game explains how to simulate the hash function H.
• Game-3. This game sets u ∈ QR(N ).
• Game-4. This game explains how to respond to an encryption query from A.
• Game-5. This game sets R ∈ J(N ) \ QR(N ).
• Game-6. This game sets S i = s 2 i for each bit.
• Game-7 replaces the message m with a random number z.
-Game-0. This is the usual adversarial game for defining the IND-ID-CPA security of IBE protocols. The challenger picks the random oracle H : ID → J(N ) at random from the set of all such functions in the Setup algorithm and allows A to query H at arbitrary points. Thus, we have
-Game-1. This is the same as Game-0, with the following change. In Setup algorithm, instead of using a PRF F to respond to A's private key queries, we use a truly random function f : ID → {0, 1, 2, 3}. If F is a secure PRF, A will not notice the difference between Game-0 and Game-1. In particular, there exists an algorithm B 1 (whose running time is about the same as that of A) such that
-Game-2. (N, u, H) are the public parameters P P given to A in the previous game where u is uniform in J(N ) \ QR(N ) and the random oracle H is a random function H : ID → J(N ). We make the following change in the random oracle H in this game. The challenger responds to a query to H(ID) by picking a ∈ R {0, 1} and v ∈ R Z N and setting H(ID) = u a v 2 . Thus the challenger implements a random function H : ID → J(N ) as in the previous game. The challenger responds to a private key query as follows. Suppose R = H(ID) = u a v 2 for some a ∈ R {0, 1} and v ∈ R Z N . The challenger responds to a private key query for ID by setting either R = uv (when a = 1). Since v is uniform in Z N this will produce a square root of R or uR which is also uniform among the four square roots, as in the previous game. Thus, A's views in Game-1 and Game-2 are identical and therefore,
-Game-3. In this game, the challenger chooses u uniformly in QR(N ) instead of J(N )\QR(N ). Since this is the only change between Game-2 and Game-3, A will not notice the difference assuming that the QR assumption holds for RSAgen. In particular, there exists an algorithm B 2 (whose running time is about the same as that of A) such that:
-Game-4. We describe below in detail how, in this game, the challenger responds to an encryption query from A.
• He chooses R ∈ QR(N ) and sets H(ID) = R. (*) • He chooses s ∈ R Z N and computes S j = s 2j for an odd value j.
• He sets c ← Encrypt(P P, ID, m).
• He sends (S, c) to A.
-Game-5. In this game, we make a change in the challenge phase. We replace the line (*) in Game-4 with the following:
• He chooses R ∈ J(N ) \ QR(N ) and sets H(ID) = R.
Since the only difference between Game-5 and Game-4 is that R ∈ J(N ) \ QR(N ) in Game-5 instead of R ∈ QR(N ) in Game-4, A will not notice the difference assuming that the QR assumption holds for RSAgen. In particular, there exists an algorithm B 2 (whose running time is about the same as that of A) such that:
-Game-6: In this game, we encrypt the message by choosing s i ∈ Z N independently and randomly for each bit. In other words, we replace the Jacobi symbols . To prove that Game-6 is indistinguishable from Game-5, we present the following Theorem.
Theorem 3
The distribution of the Jacobi symbols The proof of this theorem is based on the work of Damgard [9] . He proved that the Jacobi sequences are indistinguishable from random. i.e. if an adversary knows the value of a N , it is a hard problem to find a+1 N for an unknown value a. Although the values of a and a + 1 are highly correlated and dependent, that does not mean that their Jacobi symbols are correlated. We now present a formal proof for the above theorem.
Proof. Damgard proved that the following is a hard problem [9] . Lemma 4. Let J be the Jacobi sequence modulo N with a starting point a and length P(k), for a security parameter k and polynomial P. Given J, find where a 1 = 2y i1 s j1 + 2 − a, a 2 = 2y i2 s j2 + 2 − a.
Since Z N is an additive group, the values of a 1 , a 2 and P exist in both sequences for any value y or s which means that both sequences represent the Damgard hard problem. Moreover, guessing the Jacobi symbol 
